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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1577 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 KENNETH TOWNSEND, 
    Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (W.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cr-00125-003) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 17, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Kenneth Townsend was convicted of drug offenses and sentenced as a career 
criminal, but the District Court gave him a downward variance from the recommended 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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guidelines range.  We vacated his sentence in light of Supreme Court precedent that 
invalidated portions of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. 
Ct. 2551 (2015).  On remand, the District Court granted the government’s request to 
enhance Townsend’s sentence for obstruction of justice, and the Court resentenced him to 
the full length of his original sentence.  On appeal, Townsend challenges the Court’s 
reliance on the remarks of an accomplice made in a proffer to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  We conclude that the Court did not clearly err in crediting those remarks 
and will therefore affirm.    
I.  Background  
 A.  Arrest and Trial   
 In late 2011 and early 2012, the FBI and law enforcement officers in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania conducted an investigation into local heroin trafficking.  Through a wiretap, 
they determined that Damon Boyd and Carter Gaston were dealing cocaine and heroin.  
The investigators also became suspicious of Townsend after they observed Boyd and 
Gaston repeatedly entering and exiting from Townsend’s residence.     
Soon after, the agents learned of a cocaine transaction happening there.  They 
followed Boyd and Gaston as those two drove away from the home.  The agents stopped 
them and arrested Boyd on an outstanding warrant.  While conducting a standard 
inventory search of the vehicle, they discovered crack cocaine.  The cocaine was still wet, 
indicating that it had been recently processed.  The agents obtained a search warrant for 
Townsend’s home and promptly conducted a search.  There they found cocaine and items 
associated with the processing of crack.     
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 Townsend was convicted of possession with intent to distribute less than 500 
grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and of possession with intent to 
distribute 28 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1).  He was also 
charged with, but not convicted of, conspiracy to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  During trial, he testified that the only time that he had 
ever processed cocaine for Boyd was on the day he was arrested.  The jury could not 
reach a decision on the conspiracy charge and that charge was dismissed.     
B.  Sentencing and Appeal  
 Townsend was sentenced as a career offender pursuant to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1.  He had two prior offenses that contributed to his status 
as a career offender: possession with intent to deliver cocaine (a controlled substance 
offense) and fleeing a police officer (which at the time was considered a crime of 
violence).1  The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a prison sentence of 360 months to 
life, but the District Court granted Townsend’s request for a downward variance and 
sentenced him to 200 months in prison.  In explaining its decision to grant the variance, 
the Court noted that Townsend’s “record is light with respect to violent tendencies” and 
that Townsend “has shown some inclination toward bettering himself and learning a trade 
both before and after his arrest.”  (Suppl. App. at 102.)  The District Court therefore 
concluded that the sentence was “sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the 
goals of [18 U.S.C.] Section 3553.”  (Id. at 103.)  
                                              
1 As explained herein, we later determined that Supreme Court precedent 
undermined the conclusion that his conviction for flight was a crime of violence.  
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 The government had argued that Townsend qualified for an obstruction of justice 
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  It claimed that he had offered false 
testimony when he claimed that he had only cooked crack cocaine for Boyd on a single 
occasion.  Because Townsend qualified as a career criminal, and therefore already faced 
an elevated recommended sentence, the District Court did not resolve whether an 
obstruction of justice enhancement was proper.   
 Townsend appealed his sentence, raising a variety of arguments about whether 
there was probable cause to search his home and whether he had been denied his right to 
confront a witness.  United States v. Townsend, 638 F. App’x. 172, 175-77 (3d Cir. 
2015).  We determined those arguments to be meritless and affirmed his conviction.  Id.  
But, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015), we concluded that Townsend’s prior conviction for eluding a police officer no 
longer qualified as a crime of violence, Townsend, 638 F. App’x at 178, and therefore 
Townsend no longer qualified as a career criminal.  Accordingly, we vacated his sentence 
and remanded to the District Court for resentencing.   
 C.  Resentencing  
 On remand, the District Court held a new sentencing hearing.  The government 
argued for imposing the obstruction of justice enhancement that had been passed over 
during the first sentencing.  It also urged the Court to impose the same sentence that had 
originally been imposed because, while “Mr. Townsend may no longer be a career 
offender in terms of the legal definition, he is a career offender by every other 
definition.”  (App. at 87a.)   
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 Townsend responded that Gaston’s statements were unreliable because he made 
them out of a self-serving desire to reduce his own sentence.  Townsend also noted that 
Boyd at one point had called Gaston to ask for Townsend’s number, which, Townsend 
claimed, undermined the assertion that Boyd worked with Townsend on numerous 
occasions.  Moreover, according to Townsend, his earlier interactions with Boyd only 
involved marijuana, not cocaine.     
 The Court evaluated the record from the original sentencing hearing, as well as 
supplemental information, the guidelines, and the parties’ arguments.  It credited 
Gaston’s statement as being believable and noted that there were “other indicia that Mr. 
Townsend and Mr. Boyd had a relationship including Mr. Townsend’s knowledge of Mr. 
Boyd’s street name, his knowledge of Mr. Boyd’s voice, and the manner in which they 
conversed.”  (App. at 98a.)  It found that Townsend’s claim that he had only 
manufactured crack on one occasion was “a perjured statement by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  (App. at 98a.)  The Court therefore concluded that an obstruction of justice 
enhancement was appropriate.   
 As a result of that sentence enhancement and Townsend’s criminal history, the 
recommended guidelines range became 135 to 168 months imprisonment.  The Court 
agreed with the government’s argument that Townsend’s criminal history category did 
not “appropriately reflect the seriousness of [Townsend’s] criminal record” or “the 
likelihood of recidivism in this case.”  (App. at 100a-01a, 110a.)  And the Court 
emphasized that, when imposing the original sentence it had “varied downward from the 
guidelines … to achieve a sentence in that case that balanced the very serious nature of 
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this drug trafficking offense, [Townsend’s] criminal history, and the needs for just 
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation.”  (App. at 110a.)  Additionally, because the 
Court had “discount[ed] … [Townsend’s] career offender status,” the fact that Townsend 
was “no longer considered a career offender” did not “change what [the Court] believe[d] 
to be the appropriate sentence in this case.”  (App. at 110a-111a.)  It thus re-imposed the 
original sentence of 200 months.   
 Townsend appeals that sentence.  
II.  Discussion2 
 According to Townsend, the District Court erred when it granted the government’s 
motion for a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice.  We review for clear error 
the District Court’s factual determination that Townsend falsely testified under oath, 
United States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2014), and we review the decision 
to apply the sentencing enhancement for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Fumo, 655 
F.3d 288, 314 (3d Cir. 2011).  The defense has two arguments.  First, that the Court erred 
in considering Gaston’s hearsay testimony, and second, that the Court did not sufficiently 
address each of the elements of perjury.  We reject both.  
 As for Gaston’s hearsay statements, it is well established that out-of-court 
statements may be relied upon during sentencing as long as they have “sufficient indicia 
of reliability.”  United States v. Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, there were sufficient indicia of reliability 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).  
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and the Court did not err in crediting Gaston’s remarks.  Gaston spoke to the FBI as part 
of his “safety-valve” proffer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  That provision allows a 
court to sentence a defendant without regard to statutory minimums, when certain 
conditions are met.  In particular, the defendant must have “truthfully provided to the 
Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or 
offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or a common scheme or plan.”  Id.; 
see also United States v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 751 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the 
requirement of truthfulness).  Satisfying the truthfulness element requires candor and 
openness.  Sabir, 117 F.3d at 754; see also United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 607 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (“The defendant’s burden under the safety valve is a true burden of proof that 
rests, at all times, on the defendant. To carry his burden, the defendant must persuade the 
district court that he has made full, truthful disclosure of information required by the 
safety valve.”).  Gaston therefore had a strong incentive to be forthright.   
 Furthermore, satisfying the truthfulness element does not depend on providing 
novel information that furthers an investigation or leads to another’s conviction.  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) (noting that “the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful 
other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information 
shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this 
requirement”).  So, Gaston did not need to falsely implicate Townsend.  Indeed, if his 
remarks were proven false, he would have been denied the benefits of the safety valve.   
 There were also other indicia of reliability that the District Court noted, such as 
Townsend’s knowledge of Boyd’s street name, his ability to recognize Boyd’s voice, and 
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the familiarity with which he treated Boyd.  In addition, the police had observed Boyd at 
Townsend’s home on at least one other occasion.  Townsend’s familiarity with Boyd 
gave added credibility to Gaston’s assertion that Townsend had cooked cocaine for Boyd 
before. Thus, the District Court could properly rely on Gaston’s remarks.  
 In contrast, Townsend’s remarks were highly self-serving because they reduced 
the likelihood that the jury would find him guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine – a 
tactic that bore fruit in the form of a hung jury and dismissal of the conspiracy charge.  
While there is some evidence cutting in favor of Townsend, such as Boyd not knowing 
Townsend’s telephone number, the District Court did not clearly err in finding Gaston’s 
account more credible.3  Therefore, the Court did not err when it concluded that 
Townsend had perjured himself on the stand.   
 Townsend also obliquely attacks the District Court for not being sufficiently 
thorough in its analysis of the other elements of perjury.  It is clearly “preferable for a 
district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear 
finding.”  United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993).  But it is enough for a court 
to “make[] a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all 
of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.”  Id.  That was the case here, as the 
Court noted that Townsend’s statements “were intentional misrepresentations on material 
matters and contrary to other evidence.”  (App. at 97a-98a.)  The Court therefore did not 
                                              
3 Townsend admitted to having sold cocaine for several years to numerous other 
individuals.  That was consistent with Gaston’s account that Townsend was known for 
his skill with cocaine manufacture and distribution.   
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abuse its discretion when it found that Townsend had committed perjury and applied the 
sentencing enhancement. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s sentencing decision.  
